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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As policymakers in Madison redesign the state’s child care subsidy program – known as Wisconsin 
Shares – it is important to understand the original vision for the program.  This report investigates the 
development and implementation of Wisconsin Shares and its linkages to the state’s landmark W‐2 
welfare reform initiative.  In particular, we explore how the specific foundational child care policies 
enacted to effectuate W‐2’s larger reform goals impacted child care quality, and the consequences for 
those now seeking to redesign the program.   
We find that the paramount goal of Wisconsin Shares’ designers was to rapidly produce sufficient child 
care capacity to serve thousands of families transitioning from welfare to work.  Conversely, the creation 
of high quality child care centers – the type that research shows can produce significant dividends for 
disadvantaged children by making them better prepared to succeed in school – was not an explicit goal, 
though policy debates at the time included discussion about how quality would be impacted by the new 
system, and in later years the state funded some quality improvement efforts.     
With the benefit of nearly 15 years of hindsight, it is now apparent that the key child care policies 
implemented in conjunction with the implementation of W‐2 contributed significantly to the 
achievement of welfare reform’s larger goals, but failed to promote child care quality.  This experience 
provides insights for those now seeking to revamp the child care subsidy program, while also illustrating 
the challenges inherent in attempting to enhance child care quality by transforming a system that was 
initially designed with much different objectives in mind.        
Keystone welfare reform policy goals related to child care 
Our analysis of legislative and administrative documents, transcripts of legislative committee meetings 
and public hearings, news reports, and other sources, reveals the four primary goals of the designers of 
W‐2 with respect to child care:  
1. A focus on work, treating child care as a work support and potential source of employment for 
low‐income families, and not as a means for educating children; 
2. Prioritizing parents’ choice of their child care provider;  
3. Quickly expanding the supply of child care so as to fast‐track welfare reform’s implementation 
and create jobs; and 
4. Prioritizing the affordability of child care, both for families and the state. 
Wisconsin Shares policies serving W-2 goals 
Effectuating those policy goals required a series of calibrated child care policies.  This report focuses on 
four initial child care policies established by the architects of W‐2 to achieve the goals cited above and 
the overriding objective of reducing welfare caseloads and easing the transition of low‐income parents 
from welfare to work: 
 Moving the Goal Posts Page 4 
1. Creating a new, less-regulated category of care provider, as a means of allowing parents 
broader choices in providers, quickly creating jobs, and keeping child care costs low for parents 
and the state. 
2.  Sharing costs with parents by basing co-payments on the cost of care, as opposed to the 
parents’ income, in order to allow parents to opt for more costly care at their own discretion, 
while also lowering costs for the state. 
3. Creating a more restrictive definition of “low-income,” in order to serve the working poor in 
general, and not just those obtaining or seeking jobs as part of the W‐2 program.   
4. Tying subsidy rates to prices in the private market, in order to provide low‐income parents with 
access to the entire market while also relying on competition to keep the state’s costs in check.   
We find that each of these policies – while in some cases furthering the larger objectives of W‐2 – had 
detrimental and unintended impacts that will complicate today’s efforts to reform Wisconsin Shares.  
Those impacts include: 
• A dramatic increase in overall costs of the subsidy program without a corresponding 
improvement in quality.  Significant fraud in the system also has contributed to the large 
expense.  Today, Wisconsin Shares is a very costly program that does little to encourage high‐
quality care.   
• A child care subsidy system largely built on incentives designed to increase child care supply as 
quickly and cost effectively as possible.  Many of those incentives remain in effect today, despite 
the fact that the initial flood of individuals transitioning from welfare to work leveled off years 
ago.       
• A child care market in Milwaukee County with so many subsidized parents that there are not 
enough private payers to establish a true private market.  The subsidy, therefore, is not based 
on a competitive market and providers have no incentive to compete on price or on quality.       
Implications for YoungStar 
 YoungStar is a five‐star quality rating and improvement system that is intended to rate provider quality, 
link subsidy rates to quality, and provide information about quality to parents as they choose a provider.  
This initiative reflects a transformation in the philosophical underpinning of the Wisconsin Shares 
program.   
In particular, YoungStar is designed to go beyond the health, safety, and nutritional regulations that until 
now have been a major focus of state policy with regard to child care quality.  YoungStar includes 
educational content, the learning environment, and provider business practices among the factors to be 
considered in determining each provider’s rating.  By offering higher subsidy rates for higher ratings, 
Yougstar should directly incentivize higher educational quality and shift the focus to securing a sufficient 
supply of quality care, as opposed only to a sufficient supply of care in general.      
Implementation of this approach – particularly in Milwaukee County – poses several challenges, 
however.  In particular, the impacts of the following proposed YoungStar policies on the quality of early 
childhood care may require additional scrutiny:  
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• Stepping up collections of co-payments from parents.  While participating providers in 
Wisconsin Shares should collect co‐payments from parents, that requirement has not been 
vigorously enforced.  In conjunction with the implementation of YoungStar, the Department of 
Children and Families (DCF) now intends to do so, by contractually obligating providers to collect 
parent co‐payments.  There is concern, however, that an enforced co‐payment requirement will 
cause providers who serve mostly low‐income families to leave the program if they are not able 
to collect the co‐payments, even if they are providing quality care.  The department 
acknowledges this risk, but argues that enforcing the co‐payment requirement will benefit 
quality by generating more income for providers to invest in their businesses.  There also is a 
potential detrimental effect if parents who cannot afford to make weekly co‐payments leave the 
regulated child care market and opt for informal, unregulated care.   
• Keeping income eligibility limits for working families at current levels.  The pool of families 
eligible for Wisconsin Shares subsidies is growing because Wisconsin family incomes are not, 
which swells overall program costs.  As more money is tied up in providing access to care, less 
will be available to improve the quality of care.  Options for cutting costs would be to reset 
eligibility limits to exclude more families, or to appropriate a sum‐certain amount and create a 
wait list for the subsidy.  Both of those options, however, would retreat from the goal of serving 
all the state’s low‐income families.  So far, DCF has sought to control overall costs by identifying 
and eliminating fraud and waste in the system – a vital and laudable goal, but one that might 
eventually run its course once fraudulent providers are identified and eliminated.     
• Tying subsidy rates to quality so as to incentivize quality improvements.  The higher subsidy 
rates have the potential to “correct” the private market by linking quality to price.  There is a 
risk, however, that private pay families will not be able to afford the higher rates charged by 
quality providers (who may raise their rates to match their higher level of subsidy).  If that were 
to happen, such families may have to seek lower quality options than they are using today.  In 
addition, because YoungStar has been designed to be revenue neutral (at least initially), most 
providers will continue to earn the same subsidy rate after the initial round of rankings as they 
do today.  If providers are not certain their investments in quality will result in higher subsidies, 
they may not see YoungStar as an incentive to improve; and without a stick in the form of 
potentially lower rates, the carrot may not be enticing enough.    
Conclusion  
We find that while many of the objectives associated with the four original child care‐related policy 
goals of W‐2 were met, the policies enacted to achieve those goals had detrimental effects on the 
quality of child care in Wisconsin.  Also, a key objective that was not achieved was keeping the state’s 
costs under control.  Because the policies implemented did not attempt to tie the subsidy rates to 
quality, the end result has been a very expensive program of mostly lower‐quality care.   
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While YoungStar certainly has potential to improve quality, those implementing the program may wish 
to pay careful attention to the following cautions gleaned from a retrospective examination of the 
history of Wisconsin Shares: 
1. Policies designed to fund child care as a work support differ fundamentally from policies designed to 
fund high‐quality early childhood care and education.   Those seeking to implement YoungStar must 
determine whether policies aimed at creating and sustaining child care jobs and providing robust 
consumer choice – including the continued existence of provisionally certified providers – are still 
relevant and consistent with the quality‐focused objectives of YoungStar.  
 
2. Unintended consequences regarding the quality of child care and early childhood education are 
possible both from intervening in the child care market and from not intervening.  For example, 
requiring co‐payments may put child care out of reach of some parents, but not requiring collection 
of co‐payments may allow providers to compete on economy rather than on quality.  Whether and 
how to aggressively enforce co‐payments without contradicting the goals of YoungStar is one of the 
most challenging dilemmas facing program architects. 
 
3. Controlling costs in the face of growing subsidy program participation has been a daunting challenge 
for the state, and will be even more so when dovetailed with a new goal of incentivizing quality.  The 
state’s efforts to control costs during the early years of W‐2 were stymied by the lack of growth in 
family incomes, which caused the pool of eligible families to increase.  Identifying the financial 
resources to reward quality during a time of increasing need among Wisconsin families may require 
limiting the supply of subsidies, restricting program eligibility, or both. 
 
4. Aligning profit incentives with quality incentives may be the most effective way to avoid 
encouraging low‐quality care for Shares participants, but other challenges may emerge.  Allowing 
subsidy rates to be disconnected from the cost of care has resulted in subsidy rates so high that 
providers have little need to compete on quality.  Yet, while YoungStar holds great potential to 
create a more market‐based and quality‐driven subsidy program, controlling costs may still be an 
obstacle, and incentivizing high quality among providers that serve mostly cost‐sensitive, private pay 
families may prove difficult.  
But perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from this history, if policymakers hope to mitigate 
unintended consequences, is that they must carefully consider all the potential outcomes of their policy 
decisions and be flexible as regulations are tested.  Just as Wisconsin Shares policies were very dynamic 
in the years after initial implementation, YoungStar policies may need frequent tinkering.   
A proven, robust relationship exists between higher‐quality early childhood care and education and 
positive outcomes in children such as greater academic achievement, higher earnings potential, and 
productive citizenship.  These long‐term benefits drive the need for child care policy with a focus on 
quality.     
 Moving the Goal Posts Page 7 
INTRODUCTION 
Wisconsin’s child care subsidy program for low‐income families, Wisconsin Shares, is in the midst of a 
fundamental reform.  For more than six years, state policymakers have debated whether the program 
should be used as an incentive for quality improvements in the child care marketplace.  Now, the 
legislature has asked the state Department of Children and Families to create a five‐year plan for the 
program to do just that.  This policy reform, called the YoungStar initiative, coupled with extensive 
media coverage of fraud in the program, has focused the public’s attention on the role of state 
government in the funding and regulation of child care.   
Before the proper role of government can be defined, however, it is important to understand how 
policies implemented at the time of the landmark welfare reform legislation have impacted child care 
quality.  In particular, to what extent have the state’s policies governing the Shares program resulted in 
the general lack of high‐quality child care across Wisconsin?  Gaining insight into the consequences of 
yesterday’s policy goals should be instructive to policymakers as they grapple with reforming the 
program, and may help to avoid unintended impacts from today’s policy decisions.   
This research builds on the Public Policy Forum’s past three years of research exploring the economic 
benefits of high‐quality early childhood education.  High‐quality early childhood care and education can 
result in economic benefits stemming from increased school readiness, reduced use of special 
education, reduced use of public assistance, and reduced criminal involvement, among other benefits 
(see sidebar).  The Forum has published nine reports analyzing how much Southeast Wisconsin invests in 
quality; how parents, teachers and providers feel about the current system; the barriers to achieving 
high quality in the region; and options for funding system improvements.  Our economic analysis also 
has revealed market failures in the Milwaukee region’s child care system manifested by a lack of both 
supply and demand for the type of quality care that would best serve the region’s economic interests. 
This report explores how the state’s policies with regard to child care subsidies may have contributed to 
this market failure.  Specifically, it investigates how child care policies designed to further the goals of 
welfare reform impacted the creation of high quality early education environments, as well as the 
implications for changes now being considered and implemented.  
The new YoungStar initiative is, in fact, an attempt to reverse the system’s market failure by creating 
fiscal incentives for high‐quality early care and education (see sidebar).  With this report, we hope to 
inform key early stages of YoungStar’s implementation by providing a deepened understanding of the 
impacts of previous policies.  The focus is on the YoungStar plan as approved in the 2009‐2011 biennial 
state budget, which differs in some ways from previous quality ratings and improvement initiatives 
debated by the legislature.  This research rests on the assumption that, when attempting to fix a broken 
system, chances of success increase when one understands the roots of the system’s failures.     
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What does high quality care look like?  
Why is it important? 
Definitions of high‐quality early care and 
education vary, but such care often features 
many of the following characteristics: 
• Teachers with four‐year college degrees in 
early childhood education; assistant teachers 
with two‐year degrees. 
• Teachers and assistant teachers who are well‐
compensated and have ongoing professional 
development opportunities (which results in 
low staff turnover). 
• Smaller teacher‐child ratios. 
• For three‐ and four‐year olds, the use of a 
professionally developed pre‐kindergarten 
curriculum. 
• Interventions with family units such as 
supportive home visits. 
• Monitoring and site visits by regulatory or 
accrediting agencies. 
A consistent body of research concludes that 
high‐quality early childhood care and education 
produces broad economic benefits to children 
and society as a whole.   
Longitudinal research has found that high‐quality 
early childhood education tends to produce 
better educational outcomes.  Children who are 
enrolled in high‐quality centers are more likely to 
enter school ready to learn, and less likely to 
need special education, be held back a grade, or 
drop out.  The benefits continue into adulthood 
and include lower reliance on social services, 
higher earned income, and lower criminal 
participation.  The positive outcomes have far‐
reaching economic implications.  Studies have 
produced return‐on‐investment estimates 
ranging from a $2 return on every dollar invested 
to a $17 return on every dollar invested.   
For links to these and other research studies, see 
our research matrix at 
www.publicpolicyforum.org/Matrix.htm 
 
What is the YoungStar initiative? 
The YoungStar initiative is a five‐star rating system 
for child care providers.  With this program, 
Wisconsin joins more than 20 other states that 
have child care Quality Rating and Improvement 
Systems (QRIS).   Currently in the early stages of 
implementation, YoungStar will rate provider 
quality, link Wisconsin Shares subsidy rates to 
quality, and provide parents information about 
quality as they choose providers.  The quality 
rating scale is based on five factors: education, 
learning environment, business practices and the 
health and well‐being of children in care.   
The quality of providers will be assessed with a 
validated evaluation tool.  Participation in 
YoungStar is mandatory for providers who wish to 
be recipients of subsidy dollars; providers serving 
non‐subsidized children can participate voluntarily.  
Providers with three, four, or five stars will earn 
higher reimbursement rates, while providers at 
two stars will receive the base subsidy, currently 
set at the existing rate.  Providers not in 
compliance with regulations will earn one star and 
will not be eligible for reimbursement.  This tiered 
reimbursement is intended to create an incentive 
for providers to improve their quality.   
The program design also includes training and 
technical assistance to help child care providers 
improve their quality and micro‐grants for 
equipment purchases.  The state plans to post the 
ratings of individual providers on a website for 
parents and will educate parents about the 
importance of choosing a high quality provider.   
YoungStar is estimated to cost $65 million over six 
years, including $10 million during the initial 
launch.  Approximately $1.5 million is to be used 
immediately for training and assistance to 
providers and $3 million for regulators to collect 
data and assign preliminary ratings to providers.   
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF WELFARE REFORM WITH RESPECT TO CHILD CARE 
Today’s child care subsidy program in Wisconsin results from welfare reform policies adopted in the 
early 1990s.  In 1993, the state legislature adopted legislation requiring the Department of Health and 
Social Services to propose a replacement to the cash welfare aid given impoverished families by 
December 31, 1995.  In addition, the law specified that the state’s federally‐funded Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program would be repealed by January 1, 1999.1
A legislative working group on welfare reform held public hearings throughout the summer of 1994, but 
the administration’s proposal was not released until August 1995.  Many of those who testified at the 
public hearings were concerned about child care issues, particularly issues of access and affordability.  
At the time, Wisconsin had among the most stringent child care regulations in the country,
    
2
The 20‐page proposal from Governor Tommy Thompson’s administration in August 1995 named the 
AFDC replacement program “W‐2—Wisconsin Works” and formed the basis of 1995 Assembly Bill 591, 
which was introduced in October of that year.  The bill received five public hearings and was debated on 
the floors of both chambers of the general assembly throughout the fall and winter of 1995.  On January 
1, 1996, the administration began “Operation Transition,” which included counseling new AFDC 
applicants on obtaining work rather than joining the welfare system.  The W‐2 program was not 
legislatively enabled, however, until the passage in March 1996 of 1995 Wisconsin Act 289.  (A timeline 
of legislative actions is presented below in Figure 1.)        
 which may 
be one reason why quality of care was not addressed frequently at these hearings.   
Child care subsidy policies received considerable attention during the public hearings and floor debates 
on the W‐2 bill.  In addition, the legislature had taken up a separate proposal regarding child care 
support during this same legislative session.  1995 Senate Bill 540 was the result of the work of the Joint 
Legislative Council’s Special Committee on Child Care Economics.  The committee met from June 1994 
through June 1995.  While it did not have any formal input into the administration’s development of W‐
2, the committee did invite several members of the administration to brief it on the discussions and 
deliberations during the time the W‐2 proposal was being formulated.  The committee was chaired by 
Sen. Alberta Darling and Rep. Antonio Riley and charged with the following: 
1) Determining demand, availability, and characteristics of child care providers and the child care 
delivery system;  
2) Reviewing current policies on allocation of child care resources and regulation of child care 
providers; and 
3) Devising means and incentives to increase the supply of high‐quality child care, reduce demand for 
state support for child care, and retain skilled child care providers, within the limits of current public 
resources.3
                                                          
1 1993 Wisconsin Act 99. 
   
2 Wisconsin State Journal, “Working Mother Magazine Evaluates States for Child Care,” Aug. 14, 1997.   
3 Wisconsin Joint Legislative Council, Legislation on Child Care Economics, Report No. 13, Feb. 15, 1996.   
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While most provisions in the Special Committee’s bill focused on safety in child care facilities, the bill 
also stipulated that subsequent to the demise of AFDC, child care support should be made available to 
all low‐income families that required subsidized care in order to be able to work, not just former AFDC 
recipients.  The version of the bill signed by the governor did not include this eligibility provision, but it 
was later included in the administration’s initial W‐2 proposal and did, in fact, become a foundational 
policy goal of welfare reform in Wisconsin.     
Paradoxically, Wisconsin’s welfare reform proposal expanded eligibility for child care assistance by 
eliminating the entitlement to assistance.  The federal government had defined child care support as an 
entitlement in 19884
W‐2 also included other child care policy goals, which will be analyzed in depth in this report.  For 
example, W‐2 prioritized parental choice by allowing parents to use their subsidy anywhere in the 
regulated child care market; incentivized the choice of low‐cost care; eased regulations of child care 
providers in order to quickly expand the capacity of the child care market; and funded child care as a 
“work support” program rather than as an educational program.   
 (see sidebar below), meaning that 
working families receiving AFDC‐funded cash assistance 
were entitled to receive a child care subsidy, with no 
regulation of the child care setting.  Federal welfare 
reform, passed by Congress in 1996, created the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program 
and ended the federal entitlement to child care support, 
meaning states could now choose how to structure their 
child care subsidy programs and define eligibility for 
themselves.  Because Wisconsin was working ahead of 
Congress on the issue, the state was operating under an 
assumption that it would either receive a federal waiver 
from the entitlement requirement or that federal reform 
would eliminate the entitlement.  Wisconsin therefore 
became the first state to replace the federal entitlement to 
child care assistance for those on public assistance with a 
child care subsidy program aimed at improving access to 
child care for all low‐income families, whether they also 
received other government benefits or not.   
Governor Thompson signed W‐2 into law as 1995 Wisconsin Act 289 in April 1996.  A little over a year 
later, the new child care subsidy program was running with full funding.  By June 1997, the child care 
wait list had been eliminated.  In September 1997, the state fully transitioned to W‐2 by no longer 
accepting new AFDC enrollees and not enrolling any persons in TANF that were capable of work.   
 
                                                          
4 Family Support Act, Public Law 100‐485. 
Paradoxically, Wisconsin’s welfare reform proposal expanded eligibility for child care assistance by eliminating the entitlement to assistance, becoming the first state to replace the federal entitlement to child care assistance with a program aimed at improving access to child care for all low-income families.    
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Federal Child Care Policy Timeline Although most of the child care market is a private market, there is a long history of public involvement, through both regulation and financing.  At the federal level, the public interest in child care arose with the New Deal and the creation of “emergency nursery schools” to serve as sources of jobs for teachers and nurses, and as institutions dedicated to healthy child development.  Child care policy pre-dates welfare policy, as these nursery schools operated prior to the creation of what came to be known as AFDC.  From the beginning of public child care policy discussions, the government’s role in ensuring quality in child care settings was part of the discourse.      
With the beginning of the second year, many of the units which fell far 
short of the standards for a good nursery school were closed; some new 
units have been opened and an effort has been made by the various 
states to keep those now in operation up to a high standard. Practically 
all of the states have a state supervisor trained for and experienced in 
nursery school work whose function it is to administer the emergency 
nursery schools of the state.  —Grace Langdon, “The Emergency Nursery School--A Community Agency” in Opportunity:  A Journal of Negro Life, February 1935.   
1933 Approximately 75,000 children enrolled in 1,900 emergency nursery schools established by the Works Progress Administration (WPA).  The last WPA school closed in 1943.  
1935 Congress passed the Social Security Act, including Aid to Dependent Children, the first incarnation of AFDC.  
 
1940 Congress passed the Lanham Act, which provided federal grants and loans to public or private agencies for the operation of public works.  A later administrative decree included child care facilities and programs in certain areas as eligible for these funds.  
1942 The War Manpower Commission issued a statement articulating that employers should not set up barriers to maternal employment, and that hours and shifts should cause the least disruption in child rearing and family life.  Furthermore, it stated that when needed, child care facilities under community auspices should be developed.  Subsidies covered construction in addition to operating costs.   
 The $6 million that had been authorized in the WPA child care program was shifted to Lanham Act funds, which covered child care services so all mothers (not just those receiving “home relief”) could be employed in wartime industry.  Initial public outcry at the prospect of termin- 
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  ating these programs after the war caused President Truman to request a $7 million appropriation to continue the child care programs through 1946.  Funding ceased after 1946, and most states closed their programs.  The Children’s Bureau created the first federal child care standards and recommended a staff-to-child ratio of one to 10.  
1962 Title IV-A of the Social Security Act funded child care services for parents receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  These funds allowed parents to participate in work and training programs.    
1965 The Economic Opportunity Act created Head Start to provide a pre-kindergarten educational experience to children in poverty.  The Act also provided grants to community action agencies for anti-poverty projects, including child care services.  
1968 The government issued the Federal Interagency Day Care Regulations (FIDCR), which specified stringent staffing ratios and other requirements for child care programs receiving federal funds.  In 1975, most states were found not to be meeting these requirements.    
1975 The federal government expanded child care eligibility to include low-income families not receiving AFDC.  States had broad discretion to fund an array of social services.  
1980 The federal government stopped regulating child care altogether, leaving this responsibility to the states.   
1988 The AFDC Child Care Guarantee required states to guarantee child care for all AFDC parents who were working or in education and training programs, beginning October 1990.  
1990 Congress created the Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) to improve the quality, affordability and accessibility of child care for low-income parents who were working or in some work-related education or activity.  The block grant required states to use 75% of their CCDBG funds for subsidies to families and 25% for early childhood development, school age programs, and quality improvement projects. No other regulatory requirements were included.  
1994 The reauthorization of Head Start created a new initiative to extend Head Start to infants, toddlers, and pregnant women and their families, called Early Head Start.  
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Figure 1: Timeline of welfare reform in Wisconsin with regard to child care 
  
1995 
The Child Care Bureau was established in the Administration for Children and Families of the 
Department of Health and Human Services in January 1995, to administer federal child care 
programs to states, territories and tribes for low-income children and families. 
 
1996 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 eliminated all 
federal public assistance entitlements for individuals and replaced them with block grants to 
states.  The law also repealed all federal child care guarantee provisions for public assistance 
recipients. The child care entitlements under Title IV-A (AFDC, Transitional, and At-Risk child 
care) were consolidated with the Child Care and Development Block Grant to create a Child 
Care and Development Fund (CCDF). The CCDF is administered as a block grant to states.  
Although the law contained basic requirements, most decisions about the use of funds were 
left to the states. 
 
 
Timeline excerpted from: 
A Century of Caring for Children: A history of federal and state child care legislation and 
programs for low income children in Illinois.  Illinois Facilities Fund, January 2000. 
W-2 timeline
Legis. 
votes to 
replace 
AFDC by 
1999
Gov. 
proposes 
W-2
Legis. 
takes up 
W-2
Transition 
from 
AFDC to 
W-2 
begins
Legis. 
passes      
W-2, signed 
by Gov. in 
April
Full 
transition 
to W-2
1993 Aug. 1995 Oct. 1995 Jan. 1996 March 1996 Aug. 1996 Sept. 1997
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
1994 Aug. 1996 Jan. 1997 June 1997
Shares 
begins & 
is sus-
pended
Shares 
program 
begins
Child care 
subsidy 
wait list 
eliminated
Wisconsin Shares timeline
Legis. Special 
Committee on 
Child Care 
Economics meets
Congress passes 
fed. welfare reform 
bill, creates TANF 
and Child Care 
Development 
 Moving the Goal Posts Page 14 
WISCONSIN SHARES, BY THE NUMBERS 
As welfare reform was phased in and tens of thousands of Wisconsin parents joined the job market, 
both the supply and demand sides of the child care market responded.  This section provides a sense of 
the scope of change in the market that resulted from implementation of W‐2.  It is important to bear in 
mind that the numbers presented here both resulted from and informed the policy debates and 
decisions discussed in the next section.   Milwaukee County, which was home to more AFDC recipients 
than any other county in the state, is the focus of the data trends presented here.   
Prior to implementation of W‐2, AFDC caseloads in Milwaukee County were relatively stable at 36,000 to 
37,500 families (Table 1).  The number of families receiving cash assistance under W‐2 has been much 
smaller, although enrollment has ticked up recently (Table 2).  (Caseload data during the time of 
transition, 1997‐1999, are not available in a comparable form.)   
Table 1. Milwaukee County  
Total AFDC Cases 
Year Cases 
1991 36,855 
1992 37,508 
1993 37,461 
1994 37,100 
1995 36,155 
1996 31,086 
Includes employed, unemployed, SSI, and kinship 
foster care 
Source: Wisconsin Dept. of Children and 
Families 
 
Excludes those who may have received W-2 services 
such as case management, but did not receive a 
cash payment. 
Source: Wisconsin Dept. of Children and Families 
The huge increase in job‐seeking former AFDC recipients generated by the full implementation of W‐2 
can be seen in the unemployment figures during this time.  Federal regulations define only those jobless 
individuals who are actively seeking a job as unemployed; prior to 1996, jobless welfare recipients were 
not necessarily reflected in unemployment counts.   Chart 1 shows annual caseload figures for 
AFDC/TANF in Milwaukee County, as compared to the number of unemployed job seekers.5
                                                          
5 AFDC caseload figures must be compared with caseload totals from the W‐2 years with caution, because W‐2 
caseload counts excluded SSI (Social Security Disability) and kinship foster care cases, which were moved to a 
different program. 
  During the 
AFDC years, the AFDC caseload exceeded the number of unemployed individuals.  The opposite 
occurred in the TANF years – the number of unemployed individuals exceeds the welfare caseload, due 
to both a decline in welfare caseload and a rise in unemployment.   
Table 2. Milwaukee County W-2 
Unduplicated Payment Placements 
Year Cases 
2000 11,317 
2001 12,606 
2002 15,121 
2003 16,134 
2004 17,272 
2005 13,243 
2006 10,377 
2007 9,502 
2008 9,660 
2009 11,157 
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Caseload data for 1997-1999 are not available in this format, which is the average monthly caseload. 
Unemployed individuals refers to those who are involuntarily unemployed – these individuals are able to work 
and are actively seeking work, but are unable to find a job.    
AFDC and TANF Sources: Wisconsin Dept. of Children and Families, Unemployment Source: U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
 
 
The result is that post‐1996 Milwaukee County had a vastly increased number of people looking for 
work.  As will be discussed in the next section, the Wisconsin Shares program was expected not only to 
help low‐income parents gain access to child care, but also, by doing so, to serve as a source of 
employment for many of those job seekers.  Indeed, the total number of childcare providers in 
Milwaukee County nearly tripled between 1994 and 1998, as shown in Chart 2.  The variation in the 
number of providers of each type is directly related to policy choices made by the state during the 
creation and implementation of W‐2 and will be analyzed in depth in later sections of the report. 
 
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
Chart 1. Milwaukee County Welfare Caseload and 
Unemployed Individuals, 1991-2009
Unemployed
AFDC/TANF Caseload
 Moving the Goal Posts Page 16 
 
2010 is February snapshot data only.  Data unavailable for 2004. 
1989‐2002 Source: Planning Council for Health and Human Services. 2006‐2008 Source: Wisconsin Dept. of 
Children and Families. 2010 Source: Wisconsin Dept. of Children and Families. 
 
The need for child care providers was driven by W‐2’s requirement that parents who were able to work 
must seek work.  Specific eligibility requirements will be discussed later in the report, but W‐2 and the 
creation of Wisconsin Shares resulted in many more families being eligible for a child care subsidy.  
Chart 3 illustrates the average monthly number of Milwaukee County families receiving Wisconsin 
Shares subsidies, which rose dramatically in the immediate years after AFDC ended. Table 3 shows the 
data from which Chart 3 is derived, as well as the number of Milwaukee County children receiving child 
care subsidies annually since 1997.  The recent decline in Milwaukee County families receiving subsidies 
is likely due to both higher unemployment during the recession and a crack‐down on fraud in the 
system.   
These numbers depict a welfare system and job market in great flux.  Policymakers’ desire to see low‐
income families gain employment, while minimizing their need for public benefits, guided the Shares 
program and its implementation, taking precedence over issues such as quality, child development, and 
school readiness.  The next section discusses the four keystone goals of welfare reform as related to 
child care.   
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2006 2008 2010
Licensed Group 192 237 263 302 359 498 512 497
Licensed Family 175 190 258 463 756 1,034 1,019 939
Certified Family 595 1297 2069 1642 1500 804 528 436
0
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Chart 2. Number of Milw. County Child Care Providers by 
Type, Select Years 1994-2010
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Annual total of average monthly caseloads. 
Source: Wisconsin Dept. of Children and Families 
 
Table 3. Milwaukee County Families and Children 
Receiving Child Care Subsidies 1997-2010 
 Average Monthly 
Number of 
Families 
Average Monthly 
Number of 
Children 
1997 4,016 7,131 
1998 5,303 9,735 
1999 7,352 13,595 
2000 8,404 16,057 
2001 10,229 19,496 
2002 11,144 21,318 
2003 12,109 23,171 
2004 12,346 23,601 
2005 12,510 24,121 
2006 13,141 25,651 
2007 13,420 26,694 
2008 14,040 28,318 
2009 14,705 29,516 
2010* 13,783 26,291 
*Average of Jan‐Oct caseloads. 
Source: Wisconsin Dept. of Children and Families 
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KEYSTONE WELFARE REFORM POLICY GOALS RELATED TO CHILD CARE 
As noted in the introduction, the purpose of this report is to investigate potential linkages between the 
primarily low‐quality child care market in Wisconsin today and the state’s original welfare reform 
policies.  To determine policymakers’ intent, we analyzed relevant legislative and administrative 
documents; agendas, minutes, and transcripts of legislative committee meetings and public hearings; 
and contemporaneous news reports.  These records demonstrate that the policy goals of welfare reform 
and the subsidization of child care were vigorously debated among policymakers and the public.  The 
debate resulted in explicit goals that guided policymaking as the legislation and regulations were drafted 
and the new program was implemented.    
We identify the four primary goals of W‐2 with respect to child care as: 1) a focus on work, treating child 
care as a work support, and not as a means of educating children; 2) prioritizing parental choice of child 
care provider; 3) a quick expansion of the supply of child care so as to fast‐track implementation of 
welfare reform and create jobs; and 4) prioritizing the affordability of child care, both for families and 
the state.   
In this section, we briefly define each policy goal and consider how each might be related to the quality 
of child care.  The following sections will discuss in detail the specific policy proposals that served these 
goals.   
Policy goal 1:  Work support, not education 
At the time in which the Thompson administration was developing the welfare reform plan, the 
importance of child care subsidies as a necessary ingredient 
for its success was clearly understood.  That understanding, 
however, was based on two very different rationales.  One 
was political—the legislature had explicitly expressed a 
preference for the expansion of eligibility for child care 
subsidies to all low‐income families, not just current or 
former AFDC recipients.  Thus, eligibility expansion was 
deemed necessary to gain broad legislative support for W‐2.   
The second was policy‐oriented.  The welfare reform effort’s 
“focus on work” acknowledged that access to affordable 
child care was an important work support.  Without affordable child care, AFDC recipients would not be 
able to quickly enter the workforce.  This focus on work was priority number one for the 
administration.6
There was some concern among state officials about the “risk” of treating child care only as a work 
support, and of not considering its role in the education, health, and welfare of children.
   
7
                                                          
6 Laurie Miller, “Wisconsin and Minnesota: Approaches to welfare reform and child care,” Child Care Action 
Campaign, Issue Brief No. 3, 1996.   
   Child and 
“The administration views 
child care as a means to 
family financial 
independence rather than a 
means of educating 
children.” 
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family advocates also were concerned about an “artificial distinction between care and education” and 
shared their concerns with the legislature and the administration.8  In the end, however, the attitude 
that prevailed is best described by the administration’s point man on welfare reform, Jason Turner, who 
stated, “The administration views child care as a means to family financial independence rather than a 
means of educating children.”9
Because of this lack of emphasis on child care’s role in early childhood education and school readiness, 
incentives for higher‐quality care were not a focus of the subsidy program.   
     
Policy goal 2:  Parental choice 
The administration also was very clear from W‐2’s inception that the state would not be in the business 
of providing child care by contracting with specific child care providers or centers, as had been the 
model in some other states, and as was the existing subsidy model in Milwaukee County.  Allowing 
parents free choice within the private child care marketplace thus was another top priority for the 
administration.10
In addition, expanding eligibility for child care subsidies was 
seen as a way to maintain and enhance parental choice.  The 
increase in state‐subsidized families would create more 
demand; providers were expected to respond by becoming 
more accessible to low‐income families.   
   
There was virtually no debate on the desirability of parental 
choice, likely for two reasons.  First, with few exceptions, 
Wisconsin did not have a history of contracting with child 
care providers and, consequently, no such statewide 
infrastructure existed.  And second, at the time, Wisconsin 
was seen as having a robust regulatory system that resulted in a high‐quality child care market.11
Parental choice also was thought to be a way to ensure child care would be of sufficient quality, as 
parents would obviously want to choose the best care for their children.  As one state official put it, “We 
do a disservice to moms … by saying these moms don’t care about quality child care.  We’ve gone too far 
in treating the AFDC population as victims unable to make good choices.”
  There 
is nothing in the legislative records or news reporting at the time to suggest any advocacy for the state 
to contract with child care providers to serve subsidy recipients in a closed market.   
12
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 Jim McCoy, Department of Public Instruction, testimony to Special Committee on Child Care Economics, 
November 1994.   
  
8 Tammy Baldwin, state legislator, testimony to Special Committee on Child Care Economics, February 1995. 
9 Jason Turner, Department of Health and Social Services, testimony to Special Committee on Child Care 
Economics, December 1994.   
10 Miller, supra. 
11 Working Mother Magazine, “Wisconsin among top ten best states for child care,” June 1996. 
12 Jean Rogers, Dept. Health and Human Services, quoted in Wisconsin State Journal, Feb. 19, 1996.   
“We do a disservice to 
moms … by saying these 
moms don’t care about 
quality child care.  We’ve 
gone too far in treating the 
AFDC population as victims 
unable to make good 
choices.” 
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Policy goal 3:  Fast-track implementation and job creation 
The administration was very candid about the need for expansion of the child care subsidy, and the child 
care market, to happen quickly.  In fact, the plan called for the expanded subsidy to be one of the first 
components of W‐2 to be implemented, even before the state stopped new enrollments in AFDC.   
The success of W‐2 was to hinge on the state’s ability to rapidly get people into employment.  In order 
to do so, two things had to fall into place: 1) barriers to employment, such as lack of child care, had to 
be removed; and 2) jobs had to be available.  Fast‐track implementation of an expanded child care 
subsidy could help satisfy both those needs—the child care subsidy would create more available 
workers, and a growing demand for child care would create 
jobs in the child care industry.  As Governor Thompson’s 
press secretary noted, “By requiring mothers to work, W‐2 
will increase the need for child care, thus increasing 
opportunities for providers.”13
The need for very quick job creation, however, meant that 
the new jobs would be mostly entry‐level and would not 
require advanced skills such as those necessary to provide 
higher‐quality care.   
      
Policy goal 4:  Affordable care 
Finally, if the child care subsidy was going to significantly expand the child care market, it had to truly 
improve low‐income families’ access to the market by making most care affordable.  This could be 
achieved by a generous subsidy, but a more generous subsidy would have meant serving fewer families, 
which conflicted with the goal of reaching all low‐income families.  Thus, the state had an interest in 
seeing the lower‐priced end of the child care market expand—if W‐2 were to successfully end welfare, 
families would need to utilize lower‐cost child care.   
A UW‐Madison economist testified at the time that if the subsidy 
were so low that providers could not recoup their costs when 
serving subsidized families, they would not accept these families 
into their centers and there would not be enough capacity to 
meet the needs of all newly‐employed parents.  He said that in 
the absence of a higher subsidy, “more care at a lower rate will 
reduce the state’s costs” both in terms of the subsidy program and W‐2’s overall cost.14
The administration characterized this outcome as “cost control by making hard trade‐offs,” indicating 
expansion of the low‐end of the market was not optimal due to the implications for quality, but was 
necessary for welfare reform to work.
        
15
                                                          
13 Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, May 28, 1996.   
     
14 James Walker, UW‐Madison, testimony to Special Committee on Child Care Economics, January 1995.   
“By requiring mothers to 
work, W-2 will increase the 
need for child care, thus 
increasing opportunities for 
providers.” 
“More care at a lower rate 
will reduce the state’s 
costs.” 
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WISCONSIN SHARES POLICIES SERVING W-2 GOALS   
To further the key child care‐related goals associated with welfare reform, four specific policies were 
included in the original design of the Wisconsin Shares subsidy program:  1) relaxing provider regulations 
to ease the entry of new providers into the market; 2) sharing costs with parents via co‐payments to 
keep government’s costs low; 3) serving all low‐income families, not just former AFDC recipients; and 4) 
ensuring equal access to the private market by subsidy recipients.   
This section discusses the impact each of these original policies has had on child care quality.  In 
addition, it considers whether the impacts on quality were unintended consequences or known risks.  
Finally, this section highlights the implications for today’s policymakers as they attempt to implement a 
new policy goal for the child care subsidy program—high‐quality early childhood education—and reform 
a system that evolved under a very different policy goal—building the supply of child care for working 
families.   
Easing entry to the market: provisionally certified care 
W‐2’s architects created a new class of minimally regulated child care providers, which had obvious 
implications for child care quality.  At the time, however, policymakers were less concerned about 
quality than about creating jobs, providing parents with choices, and keeping costs in check.  In the end, 
two of these three objectives were achieved: jobs were created and parents enjoyed choices among 
providers.  But the program quickly became very expensive, resulting in a program with both high costs 
and lower quality.  Those seeking to implement the new YoungStar program now must determine 
whether policies aimed at creating and sustaining child care jobs and providing robust consumer 
choice—including the continued existence of provisionally certified providers—are still relevant and 
consistent with the quality‐focused objectives of YoungStar.     
    Policy      Policy Goals 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15 Miller, supra.   
Provisional 
certification
Job creation
Affordability
Parental 
choice
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The new class of child care providers was known as “provisionally certified” (see sidebar).    Although the 
name of this classification implied otherwise, a memo from the Bureau of Welfare during the bill 
drafting process indicated that these providers were not necessarily expected to move up into a more 
regulated class of care: “Currently the [statutory] language regarding child care certification describes 
provisional certification as a temporary category, typically pending the completion of the required 
training.  The new category is intended to be permanent—for those electing to remain so.”16  The 
reformers’ idea was to “allow responsible home child care providers easier entry into the W‐2 provider 
system through the creation of a new, less restrictive category.”17  This “less formal category of 
certification” was thus created “in an effort to increase the supply of informal and part‐time 
providers.”18
                                                          
16 Memo from the Bureau of Welfare Initiatives to the Legislative Reference Bureau commenting on an early draft 
of 1995 AB 591, October 10, 1995. 
   
17 ”W‐2: Wisconsin Works,” pamphlet by administration of Gov. Tommy Thompson, August 3, 1995.  
18 Ibid. 
Requirements for Regulated Child Care Providers  
   Maximum  
Type of Provider  Provider Training  Continuing Education  Provider/Child Ratio  Licensed group  Post-secondary  25 hours per year if  Varies by age of child—   education courses and  provider works more  1:4 for infants to 1:18   80 working days of  than 20 hours per week;  for children 6 years and   experience as a full-time  15 hours per year if  older. Maximum   assistant child care  provider works 20 hours  number of children per   teacher, or 120 working  per week or less  group varies by age of   days as a half-time   children   assistant child care     teacher    Licensed family  40 hours or 3 credits,  15 hours per year  1:8, depending on age   plus 10 additional   of children; maximum   hours if caring for   of 8   infants/toddlers    Regularly certified  15 hours  Not required by State;  1:6, depending on age    counties and tribes may  of children; maximum    require up to 5 hours per  of 6    year   Provisionally certified  None  None  1:6, depending on age     of children; maximum   Source: Legislative Audit Bureau 
Note: all providers must have safety training.    
 of 6  
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While allowing new providers to quickly and easily become part of the child care market obviously 
would help facilitate the fast‐track implementation of the reform, policymakers also seemed to be 
relying on growth in this class of provider to help keep costs low, for parents as well as the state.  The 
choice of a provisionally certified provider was subsidized at a lower rate than a regularly certified 
provider.19
The opportunity to receive a subsidy for this type of informal care was thought to benefit low‐income 
families that would not be a part of a formal child care market, either due to personal preference or 
perhaps due to transportation, language, or other barriers.  Thus, provisionally certified providers also 
helped satisfy the administration’s prioritization of parental choice.
  The lower rate was justified because of the lower regulatory requirements, but also because 
most were anticipated to be relatives of the children in their care.   
20
Perhaps the best summary of the various ways in which provisional certification would meet the policy 
goals of the administration came from the editorial board of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel: “State 
officials see the plan as offering parents cheaper day care and increasing the supply by placing fewer 
restrictions on providers.  Another plus, it adds jobs to the labor pool for welfare parents who must now 
participate in the W‐2 program.”
  
21
The plan did come under fire from child advocates and others,
    
22 who feared provisional care would 
negatively impact child care quality, decrease wages among child care workers, and increase the risk of 
child abuse.23  An analysis by the Wisconsin State Journal showed provisionally certified providers in 
Dane County would earn just $1.50 per hour per child if they were reimbursed at half the rate of 
certified providers.  The implications for quality were clear: only low‐skilled providers would be willing to 
accept such low pay.24
Others questioned the need for provisionally certified care given the sufficiency of slots in regulated 
care in Milwaukee County, but the generally held view was that more slots would be needed once W‐2 
went into full effect.
   
25  Provisional certification was touted by the administration as a “method to 
increase the supply” with family‐based care.26
Meanwhile, those advocates who argued that increasing capacity via provisionally certified providers 
would result in “all these little day‐care centers popping up with people being paid to sit and do what 
   
                                                          
19 Legislative Reference Bureau, “Wisconsin Works (W‐2): A Brief Description,” Brief 96‐1, May 1996. 
20 In Milwaukee County, the elimination of contracted providers also expanded parental choice.   
21 Mary Beth Murphy, “Welfare plan’s child care provision blasted,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Aug. 26, 1995. 
22 For example, the League of Women Voters went on record in opposition to “a new classification of child care 
with less regulation and less training.”   
23 Anne Statham & Pam Fendt, W-2: An Analysis of Feasibility and Impact, Institute for Wisconsin’s Future, October 
1995 
24 Wisconsin State Journal. Aug. 4, 1995. 
25 The Wisconsin Council on Children and Families estimated that over 30,000 children under age 5 in Milwaukee 
County would need child care if their mothers were to leave AFDC and enter the workforce, requiring a 136% 
increase in child care capacity in the county.  Statham & Fendt, supra, 1995. 
26 Jason Turner, Department of Health and Social Services, testimony to Special Committee on Child Care 
Economics, December 1994.   
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they normally do around the house”27 were challenged to provide a solution to the capacity problem.  
Said Rep. Robert Jauch, “W‐2 is going to be implemented and we’re going to have a crisis for families . . . 
I think the burden is on the advocates to now come up with their alternative to explain how . . . this 
state is going to provide more day care slots.”28
In the end, provisional certification was an important ingredient in the quick implementation of W‐2 and 
allowed many former AFDC recipients to take new jobs, including jobs as child care providers.  In fact, 
the growth in provisionally certified child care was faster than the growth of every other type of child 
care provider in the initial year of the program.   
   
Provisionally certified providers did not, however, become a permanent source of affordable care.   
Table 4 shows that the rapid build‐up of provisionally certified providers in Milwaukee County was 
fleeting, and that the number of such providers dropped considerably over the years.  The greater 
reimbursements for certified care presumably provided an incentive for provisionally certified providers 
to become certified.29
 
   
Source: University of Wisconsin‐Milwaukee Employment and Training Institute  
 
The ironic consequence was that provisionally certified providers – because of their dwindling numbers 
– may not have had the widespread negative impact on child care quality that many feared, but they 
also did not help to keep program costs affordable.   Table 5 and Chart 4 show the increased spending 
on child care subsidies in Milwaukee County since 1997.  The large increase in per‐child spending from 
1997 to 1998 is a reflection of the decrease in the low‐cost provisionally certified providers, in favor of 
the higher‐cost certified and licensed providers.  The total issuances for the county have increased most 
years, only showing a decrease in 2009 (which may be related to high unemployment rates and/or 
crackdowns on fraud).  The relative stability of the per‐child and per‐family figures suggests that the 
main force driving Wisconsin Shares spending was the rising number of program participants.   
 
  
                                                          
27 Kim Strozier, Carter Child Development Center, Milwaukee, quoted in the Wisconsin State Journal, Feb. 19, 1996.   
28 Mary Zahn, “Child care advocates oppose plan,” quoting Rep. Robert Jauch (Democrat) of Poplar, Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel, July 17, 1997.   
29 The decline is also due in part to the change from reimbursing the parents for child care expenses to providing 
direct payments to providers, making informal care less attractive to parents.   
Table 4. Provisionally Certified Milwaukee County Family Child Care Providers 
 1996 1997 1998 2001 2006 2007 2008 2010 
Providers 1136 634 350 176 141 148 100 120 
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Table 5. Wisconsin Shares Spending in Milwaukee County 1997-2009 
 Monthly Per-Child 
Payment Averages 
Annual Per-Child 
Payment Averages 
Annual Per-Family 
Payment Averages 
Total Annual Milw. 
Co. Issuances  
(in millions) 
1997 $605.62 $1,816.83 $3,226.05 $13.0 
1998 $685.65 $8,238.26 $15,123.42 $80.2 
1999 $638.74 $7,634.47 $14,117.35 $103.8 
2000 $661.85 $7,966.99 $15,222.03 $127.9 
2001 $670.38 $8,066.14 $15,373.68 $157.3 
2002 $685.11 $8,244.98 $15,772.30 $175.8 
2003 $643.33 $7,733.31 $14,797.97 $179.2 
2004 $638.44 $7,673.58 $14,669.07 $181.1 
2005 $640.83 $7,702.42 $14,851.33 $185.8 
2006 $607.82 $7,313.14 $14,275.13 $187.6 
2007 $595.86 $7,166.19 $14,254.42 $191.3 
2008 $590.24 $7,090.92 $14,302.03 $200.8 
2009 $599.56 $5,405.19 $10,849.35 $159.6 
Source: Wisconsin Dept. of Children and Families. 
 
Source: Wisconsin Dept. of Children and Families. 
The move from provisional certification to regular certification likely had some associated improvements 
in quality for those providers as they obtained the required training in child development.  However, 
one study found that few provisionally certified providers went on to become licensed providers, who 
were required to have more training, operated under more regulations, and received an even higher 
reimbursement rate: “Few provisional providers moved to the licensed class of family or group 
providers. Of the 1,550 provisional providers who received day care payments in the 1996‐1999 period, 
only 36 (or 2%) had attained licensed provider status by 1999.”30
                                                          
30 John Pawasarat & Lois Quinn, Impact of Welfare Reform on Child Care Subsidies in Milwaukee County: 1996-1999 
(Part Three), University of Wisconsin‐Milwaukee Employment and Training Institute, October 1999. 
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Therefore, while provisional certification was essential to meet the job‐creation goal of welfare reform, 
the trade‐off in quality for affordability did not last.  Meanwhile, quality has continued to suffer; the 
shift of provisionally certified providers to a slightly more regulated class still lacked sufficient emphasis 
and controls on educational quality.   
Implications for YoungStar 
 
YoungStar would regulate provisionally certified providers as they are now: minimally.  While it is 
believed that most of the 300 provisionally certified providers in the state (120 of whom are in 
Milwaukee County) are caring for relatives, more information about these providers is needed to help 
state policymakers determine whether continuing to allow for this classification of provider is 
appropriate, given YoungStar’s focus on quality improvement.   
 
In light of the seemingly minor impact the provisionally certified provider classification had on program 
costs, it would appear logical that if many of these providers are caring for non‐relatives, the quality 
improvement focus of YoungStar might dictate that there no longer be a minimally regulated class of 
providers eligible for state reimbursement.  This may require establishing a timeframe in which these 
providers must obtain training in order to earn regular certification or licensure, and/or committing 
resources to providing the technical assistance necessary for them to become part of the fully regulated 
market.       
Those seeking to implement YoungStar must determine whether policies aimed at creating and 
sustaining child care jobs and providing robust consumer choice – including the continued existence of 
provisionally certified providers – are still relevant and consistent with the quality‐focused objectives of 
YoungStar. 
 
Sharing costs with parents: co-payments 
By originally basing parents’ weekly co‐payments on the cost of care, rather than on household income, 
the architects of W‐2 hoped to keep a lid on child care subsidy program costs by creating an incentive 
for parents to use lower‐cost care.  Then, after strong concerns were voiced about general 
affordability—as well as the notion of pricing low‐income parents out of the high‐quality child care 
market that might benefit their children the most—a new co‐payment system based on household 
income was implemented.  While that approach still was seen as an important mechanism for 
controlling program costs, cost savings were limited by providers’ reluctance to collect the co‐payments, 
and regulators’ failure to rigorously enforce the policy.  The issues associated with aggressive 
enforcement of co‐payments remain in place today, calling into question how such enforcement can be 
achieved without contradicting the goals of YoungStar.             
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Policy            Policy goal(s) 
 
 
The original plan to link co‐payments to cost anticipated keeping the state’s costs low in two ways.  First, 
the cost burden of higher‐quality care would be shared with parents.   Second, parents would have an 
incentive to choose affordable care.  As explained in the administration’s original welfare reform 
proposal: 
The required co-pays will be based on a percentage of child care costs, rather 
than the agency paying everything above a set parent co-pay amount.  This will 
have the effect of assuring that in selecting child care, families are sensitive to 
price differences, managing their options so as to choose a plan within their 
budget.31
Under the child care subsidy program that existed prior to welfare reform, only those families earning 
more than 50% of the state’s median income had a co‐payment, which was based on household income.  
Conversely, under Wisconsin Shares, all families were responsible for a co‐payment, which was to be 
based on the cost of child care, as well as family income.
  
32  The drafting instructions for the W‐2 bill 
specified that families earning up to 75% of the federal poverty level would pay 10% of their weekly 
child care costs, with the co‐payment increasing by a percentage point with every 1% increase in income 
relative to the poverty level.33  This was estimated to result in families choosing the most expensive care 
paying up to 46% of their gross income on child care.34
This co‐payment plan quickly came under fire.  The Special Committee on Child Care Economics had 
recommended that affordable child care should mean that families spend no more than 10% of their 
     
                                                          
31 Thompson administration pamphlet, supra, August 1995. 
32 Legislative Reference Bureau, supra, May 1996. 
33 1995 Wisconsin Act 289 Drafting Instructions, October 1995, page 18.  
34 Judith Havemann, “Wisconsin moves to cover welfare’s daycare costs,” Washington Post, Dec. 13, 1996. 
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income on child care.35  Accordingly, an outcry came from parents, many of whom previously had not 
been responsible for co‐payments.36
Advocacy groups also objected,
  
37 with some arguing that high co‐payments would reduce access to 
quality care, as parents would have an incentive to choose cheap care over quality care.38  Many 
advocates went a step further and argued that higher co‐payments would lead quality providers to 
reject low‐income children out of fear that their families would not make the payments.  They predicted 
the W‐2 co‐payment schedule would “cause the collapse of the network of child care centers in 
Wisconsin.”39
Because of the opposition, the plan was modified several times and eventually amended by the 
legislature to reduce the co‐payments to 7.5% of cost of services for families at or below 75% of poverty, 
and to 10% for families at 95% of poverty.
  
40  “We’ve heard people’s concerns and we’re doing as much 
as we can to address them,” said the chair of the senate’s welfare reform committee at the time.41  The 
new co‐pay schedule maximized cost sharing to no more than 16% of gross income for any family.42
Some kind of cost‐based co‐payment plan that would make parents sensitive to price was deemed 
necessary to keep the program’s costs down, according to the administration.
  
43  However, the cost‐
based co‐payments generated so much opposition among parents and providers, it was unable to 
contain costs to the extent hoped.  A week before the Shares program implementation began, the 
governor committed another $25 million in state funds to the subsidy program in response to concerns 
about the effect of the co‐payments on child care supply.44  Then, within one day of program 
implementation, the governor determined the program should be suspended while a new Child Care 
Working Group was appointed to review the cost‐based co‐payment plan.45
When the program was finally fully implemented in 1997, a new and very different co‐payment plan, 
based on family income, was included.  The new plan did retain one element of the original plan: 
   
                                                          
35 The definition of “affordable child care” would likely have been subject to debate under nearly any scenario 
proposed by the administration, as the governor had vetoed the provision requiring welfare reform to “assure 
affordable child care to low income families” when he signed 1993 Act 99, the legislation directing him to create a 
replacement for AFDC.   
36Havemann, supra, Dec. 13, 1996. 
37 For instance, both the League of Women Voters and the Policy Group on Welfare Reform issued statements in 
opposition to high co‐payments.   
38 Statham & Fendt, supra, 1995. 
39 John Nichols, “Tommy retreats on W‐2 daycare,” Capitol Times, Aug. 3, 1996. 
40 Ibid.  Eligibility remained capped at 165% of poverty.   
41 Ibid.   
42 Legislative Reference Bureau, “W‐2 modifications,” Brief 99‐13, December 1999.  See also, Jennifer Ehrle et al., 
“Recent changes in Wisconsin welfare and work, child care, and child welfare systems,” State Update no. 8, Urban 
Institute, Sept. 1, 2001.  The current schedule is structured so no family’s co‐payment exceeds 12.5% of gross 
income.  See Legislative Fiscal Bureau, “Wisconsin Works and other economic support programs,” Information 
Paper 46, January 2009.   
43 Miller, supra. 
44 Joel Dresang, “Thompson unveils program to promote child care,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, July 25, 1996. 
45 Nichols, supra, Aug. 3, 1996. 
 Moving the Goal Posts Page 29 
parents choosing licensed child care had a higher co‐payment than those choosing certified care.  The 
co‐payment plan, therefore, continued to provide an incentive for parents to seek lower‐cost care.  
However, in 1999, a new federal law prohibited states from charging differential co‐payments based on 
the type of child care.  Since that time, Wisconsin Shares co‐payment schedules have been based solely 
on family size, family gross income, and the number of children in child care.   
State officials also failed to implement the intended co‐payment policy in another way.  Co‐payments 
have not resulted in a true sharing of costs between parents and the state, because the state has left the 
collection of co‐payments to the providers, many of whom choose not to collect.   
Early research found that “in many cases” in Milwaukee County, the provider’s proceeds from the 
subsidy program exceeded the revenues received from non‐subsidized clients.46  Consequently, many 
Milwaukee County providers were able to comfortably avoid collecting co‐payments from parents, as 
the subsidy payments exceed their per‐child costs.47
The audit also found that the primary reason for not collecting was a belief that the parents could not 
afford to make the co‐payments and would be forced to remove their children.  Other reasons included 
“the state’s reimbursement being high enough to cover all of [the provider’s] expenses, not being 
comfortable asking parents to make their co‐payments, and believing that not collecting co‐payments 
provides a competitive advantage.”
  In 2001, the Legislative Audit Bureau confirmed 
this earlier research and found that many providers did not attempt to collect co‐payments.  In fact, the 
Bureau found that about 15% of licensed providers and 56% of certified providers reported not always 
attempting to collect co‐payments.   
48
In the end, the original goal of keeping the costs of the program in check through cost‐based co‐
payments was not achieved, due both to push‐back from parents, providers, and child advocates, as well 
as federal policy that prohibited higher cost‐sharing for costlier care.  In addition, even with the new, 
income‐based co‐payment policy, the state did not effectively enforce the co‐payment requirement, 
enabling providers to refund co‐payments or even forego collecting them entirely.  The result was that 
the incentive for choosing lower‐cost care was effectively replaced by an incentive to choose a provider 
who would not charge the co‐pay.     
   
These policy implications likely have contributed to the program’s large expense, including average 
monthly subsidy amounts that doubled in the first four years, outpacing the growth in the number of 
children and families served, as shown in Table 6.  That growth in expense has slowed in the past 
decade, however, and is now more aligned to the growth in program participants, as shown in Chart 5.  
  
                                                          
46 Pawasarat & Quinn, supra, October 1999.   
47 Ibid.   
48 Legislative Audit Bureau, “Wisconsin Shares Child Care Subsidy Program: An Evaluation,” Audit Report No. 01‐1, 
January 2001.   
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Table 6: Child Care Subsidy Growth Statewide 
Fiscal 
year 
Ave. 
monthly 
subsidy 
Percent 
growth 
Ave. no. 
of 
children 
Percent 
growth 
Ave. no. 
of 
families 
Percent 
growth 
Ave. 
subsidy 
per 
family 
Percent 
growth 
1998-99 $10,597,636  26,763  15,412  $688  
1999-00 $13,006,963 23% 31,486 18% 17,750 15% $733 7% 
2000-01 $18,181,669 40% 39,520 26% 22,435 26% $810 11% 
2001-02 $20,875,288 15% 44,985 14% 25,769 15% $810 0% 
2002-03 $22,487,129 8% 48,584 8% 27,897 8% $806 0% 
2003-04 $23,485,024 4% 51,328 6% 29,496 6% $796 ‐1% 
2004-05 $24,527,416 4% 52,341 2% 30,166 2% $813 2% 
2005-06 $25,995,189 6% 54,561 4% 31,183 3% $834 3% 
2006-07 $26,659,373 3% 56,566 4% 32,199 3% $828 ‐1% 
2007-08 $27,824,584 4% 58,379 3% 32,820 2% $848 2% 
Source: Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau 
 
 
Source: Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau 
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Implications for YoungStar 
The YoungStar reform does not propose any changes to the current co‐payment schedule, although the 
state would, for the first time, enforce the statutory co‐payment requirement by requiring all providers 
participating in YoungStar to contractually agree to collect co‐payments from parents.  The concern that 
an enforced co‐payment requirement will negatively impact the supply side of the market again has 
arisen among providers, who are worried that providers who serve mostly low‐income families will have 
to leave the program if they are not able to collect the co‐payments.   
The current administration acknowledges this risk, but argues that enforcing the co‐payment 
requirement will have an overall beneficial effect on quality by generating more income for providers to 
invest in their businesses.  There is a potential detrimental effect as well, however, if parents who 
cannot afford to make weekly co‐payments leave the regulated child care market and opt for informal, 
unregulated care, which is likely to be of even lower quality.   
One policy option would be for the state to collect the co‐payments directly, as is the policy in some 
other states.  This would lessen the financial risk for providers, but may not prevent parents who cannot 
afford the co‐payments from leaving the regulated child care market.  Other options might include 
allowing non‐profit providers to establish scholarships for parents who cannot afford co‐payments, or 
allowing providers to phase in co‐payment collection so that parents have time to make adjustments in 
their household budgets.       
 
Defining low-income: eligibility 
Subsidizing child care for all low‐income families – and not just those receiving public benefits – was 
deemed a requisite for encouraging former welfare recipients to seek and retain jobs.  However, 
meeting the goal of keeping the program affordable for the state would require a strict definition of low‐
income.  The state’s efforts to accomplish both objectives has been stymied by the lack of growth in 
family incomes, which has caused the pool of eligible families to increase and the cost of the Shares 
program to grow considerably, despite its focus on the most impoverished of working families.  This 
result also likely has had a stifling effect on child care quality, as helping families access care has created 
greater demand, which has created an incentive for growth in child care quantity, and not quality.  Thus, 
those implementing YoungStar must now seek to identify the financial resources to reward quality while 
controlling costs during a time of projected subsidy program growth. 
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Policy      Policy goal(s) 
 
 
Establishing an appropriate definition for “low‐income” was critical to welfare reform’s central goal of 
allowing parents to work by making child care more affordable, and also to the goal of keeping the 
state’s costs under control.  The definition hinged upon two determinations: At what level of income can 
a family be expected to afford 100% of the costs of child care?  And, how many low‐income working 
families can the state afford to help? 
Prior to W‐2, the maximum income limit for eligibility for a child care subsidy was set by the federal 
government at 75% of the state median income, which in 1995 was equal to an income of 220% of the 
federal poverty level (about $27,011 for a family of three).49  Under W‐2, the new subsidy program 
redefined eligibility to include only those families below 165% of the federal poverty line, or $20,857 for 
a family of three in 1996.50
Thus, in order to serve all low‐income working families and eliminate the wait list
     
51 for child care 
subsidies, W‐2 redefined “low‐income.”  The expectation was that by lowering the income limit, all such 
low‐income families could be served without spending considerably more money.52
In 1999, the program was amended by the state legislature and new, more generous, income limits 
were created.  To enroll in the subsidy program, a family now had to earn less than 185% of the federal 
  However, as noted 
in the discussion of co‐payments, costs still increased dramatically once the program was 
implemented—the lowering of the income limits, like differential co‐payments, did not keep costs down 
as hoped.   
                                                          
49 Legislative Reference Bureau, supra, May 1996. 
50 In Milwaukee County, this change resulted in 230 families who earned too much under the new rules seeing 
their subsidy phased‐out as the Shares program was implemented.  See Joel Dresang, “Child care advocates 
applaud suspension of co‐payment plan,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Aug. 6, 1996. 
51 No more families remained on the wait list for subsidies as of June 1997. Office of Gov. Tommy Thompson, 
“Governor announces end of child care waiting list,” press release, June 3, 1997. 
52 Chuck Wilhelm, Dept. of Health and Social Services, testimony to Special Committee on Child Care Economics, 
February 1995. 
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poverty level ($24,833 for a family of three) and could stay in the program until its income exceeded 
200% of the poverty level ($26,846).  This change not only opened up the program to more families, but 
also addressed an early critique of the program—the ability of a family to fall off the benefits “cliff.”   
Prior to 1999, a family of three that increased its earnings above 165% of the poverty line experienced a 
significant loss of disposable income due to the loss of the child care subsidy.  For example, if the family 
increased its income so as to exceed the eligibility limit by $1,000, it would actually lose $5,000 of 
disposable income, due to increased child care costs.53
Meanwhile, the rates of people in poverty in Milwaukee County, on the whole, have grown since the 
implementation of W‐2.  After an initial decline, the numbers have rebounded to pre‐W‐2 levels.  As 
shown in Table 7, Milwaukee County’s poverty rate grew from 13.5% in 2001 to a peak of 20.2% by 
2004.  Worth noting is that a greater share of the population under age 18 is in poverty than the 
population as a whole.  In 2008, while 17 percent of Milwaukee County’s overall population was 
impoverished, 23.1 percent of those under age 18 had household incomes below the poverty rate (Chart 
6).  Also, in real dollars, the county’s median income has declined considerably since 1997.   
  This steep drop in disposable income served as a 
disincentive for families to seek higher‐paying work and called into question whether the subsidy 
program was achieving its goal of being a work‐support program.  The legislature addressed this 
problem in 1999 Act 9 by allowing parents to retain eligibility even as their incomes increased.   
Table 7. Poverty rate and median income in Milwaukee County, 1997-2008 
 Percentage in poverty, all ages Median household income in 2010 dollars 
1997 16.5 $50,480.90 
1998 15.9 $50,671.97 
1999 14.9 $48,717.47 
2000 14.0 $50,038.70 
2001 13.5 $47,549.49 
2002 15.0 $46,497.30 
2003 16.2 $46,301.00 
2004 20.2 $45,485.92 
2005 18.4 $42,454.20 
2006 18.9 $44,662.93 
2007 18.2 $44,992.10 
2008 17.0 $46,398.32 
Source: US Census, Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates. 
 
 
                                                          
53 Public Policy Forum, “How taxes and benefits discourage people from working: Higher pay for the poor can yield 
no gain in disposable income,” In Fact, Vol. 87 No. 7, July 1999. 
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Data unavailable for 1994 and 1996.  Source: U.S. Census Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates  
 
Current Wisconsin Shares eligibility requirements mirror those enacted in 1999.  Table 8 shows the 
income limits for initial eligibility in effect today.  The current median family income in the state is 
$49,993, which means eligibility for a family of three is cut off at 68% of state median income.  As shown 
in Chart 7, which highlights the changes in the definition of eligibility over the years relative to the state 
median income, the program today actually reaches a greater portion of state families than in 1999.  
Table 8. Wisconsin Shares Eligibility According to Income and Family Size 
Family Size Monthly Income 185% of Federal 
Poverty Line 
2 $2,246 $26,955 
3 $2,823 $33,874 
4 $3,399 $40,793 
5 $3,976 $47,712 
6 $4,553 $54,631 
7 $5,129 $61,550 
8 $5,706 $68,469 
9 $6,282 $72,209 
10 or more $6,859 $75,949 
Sources: Wisconsin Dept. of Children and Families; US Dept. Health and Human Services 
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Prior to W‐2, eligibility for child care assistance was set at 75% of the state median income and 
recipients also had to be part of the AFDC caseloads.  Under W‐2, the eligibility for child care assistance 
became defined by the federal poverty level, and when compared to state median incomes, has defined 
low‐income more strictly.   However, the lower income limits were seen as a trade‐off necessary to 
affordably serve working families who had never received AFDC or other benefits.   
Child care subsidy costs ballooned despite the objective of keeping welfare reform affordable.  As 
discussed elsewhere in this report, this was caused by a variety of factors, including low co‐payments, 
high reimbursement rates, and the modification of eligibility cut‐offs.  At least some of the unanticipated 
growth in costs also undoubtedly was attributable to fraud by providers and parents.  Another key 
factor, however, has been the lack of income growth among Wisconsin households during the past 
decade‐and‐a‐half.  While many more families are indeed benefitting from the subsidy and the access to 
care it provides, the data indicate that families who are increasing their incomes to the point that they 
no longer need a subsidy are outnumbered by families who are joining the ranks of the poor and 
becoming eligible for the program.  In essence, the strategy of focusing on the most impoverished 
working families has failed to control program costs because many more Wisconsin families meet the 
definition of impoverished.     
A potential consequence of this development has been a stifling effect on child care quality.  Trying to 
help more low‐income families access care has created greater demand for care, which has created an 
incentive for growth in quantity, but not necessarily in quality of providers.   
Implications for YoungStar 
YoungStar does not call for any change in the income eligibility limits for working families or the step‐
down of the eligibility cut‐offs.  This means that program eligibility and costs can be expected to 
220%
165%
185% 185%
75%
46% 57%
68%
1995 (pre‐W‐2) 1996 1999 2010
Chart 7. Shares Income Eligibility Limits by Federal Poverty and 
State Median Income
Percentage of Federal Poverty Level Percentage of State Median Income
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increase as long as Wisconsin family incomes fail to grow. The more the state spends on providing 
subsidies, the less able it is to afford quality improvement efforts such as technical assistance, 
professional development, or capital grants.  Options for cutting costs would be to reset eligibility limits 
to serve even lower‐income families or to appropriate a sum certain amount and create a waiting list for 
the subsidy.  Either of those options, while meeting the goal of containing costs, would retreat from the 
goal of serving all the state’s low‐income working families.   
Another option is to pay only for the care provided, rather than for the total hours of care, or slot, for 
which a child may be eligible.  This strategy has been used in recent years on a temporary basis during 
times of tight state budgets.  Moving to this type of reimbursement scheme permanently would have 
implications for quality, however, as higher‐quality providers incur higher fixed costs, and incur these 
operational costs throughout the day, whether or not all children are present in the classroom.    
An option utilized recently to control costs has been to vigorously prosecute fraud and waste within the 
system.  While much of the money saved to date through these efforts has been reinvested in quality 
improvement efforts, legislators ultimately may decide to put these savings back in the general fund.   
 
Creating access: competitive reimbursement rates 
In order to create a greater supply of child care and to provide low‐income parents with access to the 
entire market, the state needed to set the child care subsidy rate at a level high enough to provide an 
incentive for nearly all providers to accept subsidized parents.  That reality conflicted, however, with the 
objective of having a subsidy program that could be fiscally sustainable over the long term.  State 
officials sought to establish a subsidy rate that struck the right balance, but they have not been 
completely successful.  While access to the market and the supply of care were greatly enhanced by 
state subsidies, program costs exploded.  Furthermore, because the subsidy is not linked to the actual 
cost of care, low‐quality providers can still earn a high subsidy rate.  YoungStar holds potential to create 
a more market‐based and quality‐driven subsidy program, though controlling costs may still be an 
obstacle, and linking quality to cost may have negative impacts on private‐pay families.    
   
         Policy              Policy goal(s) 
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The total cost of the Shares program is determined not only by the size of the state’s low‐income 
population, but also by the subsidy amount paid on behalf of each family.  The stated goal of the W‐2 
architects was to design a subsidy program that kept the state’s costs down while providing a “fair 
market reimbursement rate to providers.”54
To establish the fair market rate, Wisconsin follows federal regulations, which require states to base 
their maximum subsidies on prevailing market rates.  The federal government has called for states to 
conduct regular surveys of provider pricing since 1988, and has required such surveys since 1998.  The 
regulations specify that when states submit their two‐year plans detailing their use of federal Child Care 
Development Block Grant funds, they prove that parents utilizing a child care subsidy have “equal 
access” to the child care market that serves private pay families.  The federal equal access requirement 
is similar to Wisconsin’s policy goal of preserving parental choice.   
  The intent was to help low‐income parents afford their 
choice of care in a market that otherwise would have been out of their price range, as well as to mitigate 
the risk that the government would be overcharged for care.     
In order to prove equal access, states must rely on a child care market rate survey of the prices charged 
to parents by providers within a given geographic area (usually a county).  The state and/or county must 
then use the survey data to establish the subsidy rate (also called the reimbursement rate) within that 
county.  Under federal rules, unless granted a waiver, the state’s two‐year plan cannot rely on a market 
rate survey conducted more than two years prior.55
States are free to conduct their market rate surveys utilizing a methodology of their choosing, and little 
guidance is provided from the federal government as to how to conduct the survey or how to use it to 
ensure equal access to the market.  Federal rules do suggest that states set their reimbursement rates 
such that the maximum subsidy amount allows low‐income families to afford providers with prices up to 
the 75th percentile of cost (defined as the cost at which 75% of the slots can be purchased).  States 
reimburse parents (or pay providers directly) up to the “ceiling” established by the maximum rate.  A 
U.S. General Accounting Office study in 2002 found that more than half of the states set maximum 
subsidy rates at the 75th percentile of market prices, although not always based on the most current 
survey findings.
     
56
Wisconsin is among those states with a policy to match the reimbursement rate to the 75th percentile of 
market prices.
 
57
                                                          
54 Miller, supra. 
  Maximum rates for child care centers and regularly certified family providers have 
always been set at the 75th percentile as determined by the market rate survey, while provisionally 
55 Roberta Weber et al., Practices and Policies: Market Rate Surveys in States, Territories, and Tribes, Oregon State 
University Family Policy Program and Oregon Child Care Research Partnership, May 2007. 
56 U.S. General Accounting Office, Child Care: States Exercise Flexibility in Setting Reimbursement Rates and 
Providing Access for Low-Income Children, GAO‐02‐894, Sept. 18, 2002. 
57 There are four age groups for which maximum rates are calculated: birth through age 1, age 2 through age 3 
years + 11 months, age 4 through age 5 years + 11 months, and age 6 years and older.  Higher subsidy rates are 
available for families of children with extreme medical conditions.      
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certified family provider rates have always been at the 50th percentile.  The legislative intent at the time 
the Shares program was adopted was to allow high‐quality providers58 to be reimbursed under a 
different rate system, although the statute itself does not specify whether this system can exceed the 
75th percentile maximum rates.  Starting in 2001, this intent was realized by providing accredited 
providers a 10% increase in their reimbursement rate, provided that they charged this higher rate to 
their private pay families.59
While Wisconsin’s reimbursement schedule meets federal guidelines and is within the national norm, 
like many other states, Wisconsin is now relying on an out‐dated market rate survey to establish the 75th 
percentile.  Due to state budget constraints, Wisconsin has kept the maximum rates frozen at 2006 
levels
   
60 for the past four years, and the 2009‐11 biennial budget extends the freeze until June 30, 
2011.61
It should be noted that the market rate survey is, as one study puts it, “a survey of the prices charged for 
child care, not a survey of the costs of child care.”
  Nevertheless, administrative rules and state statutes still mandate that counties conduct an 
annual market survey, which they continue to do. 
62
Table 9 shows Milwaukee County’s current maximum reimbursement rates as established by the 2006 
market rate survey.  Those rates are then compared to the hypothetical maximum reimbursement rates 
for 2010 had they been based on the most recent market rate survey conducted in 2008.   
  Consequently, the subsidy itself is based on market 
prices and does not reimburse providers for the actual cost of providing care.   Thus, if the private 
market will not bear the price of high‐cost, high‐quality care, the subsidized market will not, either.   
Table 9. Milwaukee County Maximum Weekly Child Care Reimbursement Rates, 2006 and 2008 
Market Rate Surveys, in 2010 dollars 
 Licensed Group 
weekly ceilings 
Licensed Family 
weekly ceilings 
Regularly Certified hourly 
rates 
 0-2 
yrs 
2-3 
yrs 
4-5 
yrs 
0-2 
yrs 
2-3 
yrs 
4-5 
yrs 
0-2 
hourly 
2-3 
hourly 
4-5 
hourly 
Rates Based on 2006 
Market Survey $232 $200 $180 $190 $175 $165 $4.07 $3.75 $3.54 
Hypothetical Rates 
Based on 2008 Market 
Survey 
$262 $227 $204 $208 $190 $182 n/a n/a n/a 
Certified rates for 2008 not available. 
Sources: Wisconsin Dept. of Children and Families  
                                                          
58 Defined in the statute as “child care programs that exceed the quality of care standards required for licensure or 
for certification.” 
59 Ehrle, supra, September 2001.   
60 See http://dcf.wisconsin.gov/childcare/wishares/pdf/2006rates.pdf for all Wisconsin rates. 
61 Wisconsin Bureau of Enrollment Management, Operations Memo #09‐46: 2009 Child Care Rate Survey ‐ 
Wisconsin Shares Child Care Subsidy Program, July 27, 2009.  
62 Weber, supra, May 2007, pg 3. 
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There is some evidence to suggest that Milwaukee County’s particular provider characteristics create an 
inaccurate picture of prevailing market rates.  Under state law, child care programs must serve at least 
25% private pay families in order to be included in the market rate survey.  Because of Milwaukee 
County’s high rates of subsidy utilization among child care consumers, less than two percent of its family 
child care programs, and less than 10% of its licensed group centers, are qualified to be included in the 
analysis.  More specifically, 19 of the 1,038 licensed family child care programs in the county, and 46 of 
the 475 licensed group centers, were qualified to take the 2006 survey upon which the current rates are 
based (see Chart 8).63
Chart 8: Percent of providers included in annual Milwaukee County market rate survey 
  
  
It would appear, therefore, that the survey may fail to accurately determine market rates, because of 
both the influence of the extreme volume of subsidized families on the child care market and the 
resulting small and non‐representative sample of centers.  The public market has dominated the private 
market, instead of the other way around, which was the assumption of the “fair market rate” policy.  
Consequently, the market rates that are derived from the survey look to be unnaturally high, which in 
turn would cause the maximum reimbursement rate to be higher than it would be in a less‐subsidized 
market.  A 2006 report by the Child Care Rate Setting Task Force noted that Milwaukee’s rates have 
increased annually above the consumer price index and the inflation rate for many years.64
Ironically, today’s high reimbursements rates resulted from a policy goal aimed at reducing the state’s 
costs.  At the time W‐2 was under debate, child care providers and advocates opposed the planned 
reimbursement policies as being too low.  Dane County’s child care resource and referral agency, for 
example, calculated that family child care providers in that county would be able to earn a maximum of 
  The report 
questioned how rates could increase so dramatically in an area serving the largest low‐income 
population in the state, and concluded that the survey resulted in an inaccurate reflection of the fair 
market rates.   
                                                          
63 Child Care Rate Setting Task Force report to Secretary Roberta Gassman, Dept. of Workforce Development, 
November 2006. 
64 Ibid. 
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$4.50 per hour under the initial W‐2 proposal.65  Other advocates were concerned that these low wages, 
combined with a lack of business training, would prevent former AFDC recipients from finding stable 
jobs as family child care providers.66
Advocates also were concerned the new subsidy program was severely underfunded.  If the program 
were to serve all the estimated new families with the same amount of resources, as was originally 
assumed by the Legislative Fiscal Bureau, then the estimated annual expenditure per child would have 
been just $2,600 in that first year—too low to purchase slots with most existing providers, especially 
those of high quality.
   
67
It soon became clear that the state would need to spend much more than planned if the program was 
both to provide new job opportunities and create enough slots for all eligible children.  In August 1996, 
the administration announced that funding for child care subsidies would in fact triple in the program’s 
first year to $158.5 million, and would grow to $180 million by the second year.
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The change over time in the maximum subsidy for Milwaukee County providers is shown in Table 10.  
Most of the increase occurred between 1995 and 1999, the first three years of W‐2.  In addition, most of 
the increase has been among certified family child care providers.  The freeze in reimbursement rates 
since 2006 has meant the total Shares cost increases since that time have resulted from increases in the 
number of families served. 
  By the 2010‐11 fiscal 
year, the Wisconsin Shares program budget had grown to $402.5 million.   
  Table 10. Milwaukee County Maximum Allowable Weekly Payments for Full-Time Care by Provider and Age 
of Child, Select Years (adjusted for inflation) 
under 2 years of 
age 
1995 1999 2001 2002 2006 2010 Percent 
change  
1995 to 2010  
Percent 
change 
1999 to 2010  
Group licensed $142  $182.50  $200  $210  $232  $232  63% 27% 
Family licensed $122  $155  $180  $190  $190  $190  56% 23% 
Certified  $115.90  $145.50  $169  $178  $203.50  $203.50  76% 40% 
Provisional  $97  $112.50  $119  $135.50  $135.50   40% 
         2-12 years of age 1995 1999 2001 2002 2006* 2010* Percent 
change 
1995 to 2010  
Percent 
change  
1999 to 2010  
Group licensed $105  $153  $172.50  $182  $200  $200  91% 31% 
Family licensed $105  $140  $165  $175  $175  $175  67% 25% 
Certified  $99.75  $131.50  $154.50  $164  $187.50  $187.50  88% 43% 
Provisional  $87.50  $103  $109.50  $125  $125   43% 
*2006 and 2010 rates are for children ages 2-3. Certified and provisional rates assume 50 hrs of care per week.   
   Source: Planning Council for Health and Human Services; Wisconsin Dept. of Children and Families 
                                                          
65 George Hagenauer, “Welfare reform plan allows too little for child care,” Wisconsin State Journal, Sept. 4, 1995.   
66 League of Women Voters Social Policy website: www.lwvwi.org/cms/content/view/28/58/.  
67 Collins, James, “Workfare means day care,” TIME, Dec. 23, 1996.  See also Legislative Fiscal Bureau, 1995 AB 591 
Fiscal Note, Nov. 16, 1995.   
68 Dept. of Workforce Development, “State unveils plan to spur growth in child care,” press release, August 1996.   
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The high cost of today’s Shares program arguably could be justified if it resulted from high 
reimbursement rates that were linked to the actual cost of high‐quality care.  But, more likely, a major 
cause of the high cost is the artificially high subsidy rate produced by a market dominated by subsidized 
parents.   Wisconsin taxpayers, therefore, might reasonably question whether the state is getting its 
money’s worth.   
Implications for YoungStar 
Because the YoungStar initiative is an attempt to incentivize higher quality, it ultimately could tie the 
subsidy rate more closely to the cost of providing quality care, thus giving those child care providers that 
serve high numbers of subsidized families a significant incentive to improve quality.  But what about 
those providers that serve large numbers of non‐subsidized families?   
It is unclear whether the new reimbursement rates, like the existing 10% bonus for accredited centers, 
will be applicable only to those centers that charge rates to private pay families at least equal to the 
higher subsidy rate.  If so, and providers increase their private pay rates in order to capture the new 
subsidy rates, the new system could “correct” the market by linking quality to price for all families, 
whether they are subsidized or not.  There is a risk, however, that private pay families will not be able to 
afford these higher rates, meaning providers will not be able to increase their private pay rate and will 
have to forego the reimbursement bonus.  If that were the case, it is unlikely that YoungStar will 
positively affect quality across the system. 
Because YoungStar has been designed to be revenue neutral, most child care providers, at least initially, 
will continue to earn the same subsidy rate as they do today.  If, as is expected, higher‐quality providers 
eventually are differentiated from lower‐quality providers by a quality‐based subsidy differential, then 
the new policy goal of Wisconsin Shares could be realized, while still providing the access to child care so 
important to the W‐2 program.  This is more likely to happen, however, if the current subsidy rate can 
be moved in either direction—lower for the lowest‐quality providers and higher for better‐quality 
providers.  Because YoungStar has been designed only to move the rate higher, it may not be able to 
create a sufficient differential to improve quality.     
The original W‐2 policy goal that is most likely to fall to the wayside under any quality improvement 
initative is the goal of keeping the state’s costs low.  As this goal is the one of the four original policy 
goals that arguably has never been met, its abandonment may be just a formality.   
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CONCLUSION 
Wisconsin policymakers have been grappling with the persistence of low quality among the state’s early 
childhood care and education providers for many years, acknowledging the decades of research showing 
that lower‐quality early childhood settings are associated with costly and harmful economic and societal 
outcomes.  The recently‐approved YoungStar initiative is an attempt to use the large state child care 
subsidy program to provide incentives for improvement in quality.  But if this system reform is to be 
effective, then it is important to understand that the child care system we have today is the result of 
policy goals originally designed to impact the supply of care, sometimes at the expense of quality. 
We find that of the four major child care‐related policy goals established by the initial architects of W‐2, 
most were met.  Wisconsin Shares dramatically increased the supply of regulated child care, creating 
thousands of entry‐level jobs and enabling low‐income parents to join the workforce.  This was achieved 
because the reformers were successful in creating a policy that treated child care as a work support, as 
opposed to an educational program.  In addition, parents were able to freely choose their child care 
provider because the subsidy was accepted by nearly all providers in the market.  Unfortunately, the 
policies enacted to achieve these goals had unfortunate detrimental effects on child care quality by 
incentivizing the creation and parental selection of low‐quality care.   
The one welfare reform goal that was not achieved was the goal of keeping the state’s costs under 
control.  Because most of the policies implemented did not attempt to tie the subsidy rates to quality, 
and because there has been significant fraud in the system, the end result has been a very expensive 
program of mostly lower‐quality care.  The few policies that have recognized the high cost of high‐
quality care either were not actually implemented or have not had an effect on the market.      
The new YoungStar program is intended to improve quality, but it may be difficult to achieve that 
objective within a Shares program framework that was originally designed, first and foremost, to ensure 
an adequate supply of affordable child care providers.  In particular, policymakers might wish to 
consider the following cautions that emerge from this retrospective report: 
1. Policies designed to fund child care as a work support differ fundamentally from policies designed to 
fund high quality early childhood care and education.   Those seeking to implement YoungStar must 
determine whether policies aimed at creating and sustaining child care jobs and providing robust 
consumer choice – including the continued existence of provisionally certified providers – are still 
relevant and consistent with the quality‐focused objectives of YoungStar. 
     
2. Unintended consequences regarding the quality of child care and early childhood education are 
possible both from intervening in the child care market and from not intervening.  For example, 
requiring co‐payments may put child care out of reach of some parents, but not requiring collection 
of co‐payments may allow providers to compete on economy rather than quality.  Whether and how 
to aggressively enforce co‐payments without contradicting the goals of YoungStar is one of the most 
challenging dilemmas facing program architects. 
 
 Moving the Goal Posts Page 43 
3. Controlling costs in the face of growing child care subsidy program participation has been a daunting 
challenge for the state, and it will be even more so when dovetailed with a new goal of incentivizing 
quality.  The state’s efforts to control costs during the early years of W‐2 were stymied by the lack of 
growth in family incomes, which caused the pool of eligible families to increase. Identifying the 
financial resources to reward quality during a time of continued program growth may require 
limiting the supply of providers, curtailing program eligibility, or both. 
 
4. Aligning profit incentives with quality incentives may be the most effective way to avoid 
encouraging low‐quality care for Shares participants, but other challenges may emerge.  There is no 
doubt that allowing subsidy rates to be disconnected from the cost of care has resulted in subsidy 
rates so high that providers have little need to compete on quality.  Yet, while YoungStar holds great 
potential to create a more market‐based and quality‐driven subsidy program, controlling costs may 
still be an obstacle, and incentivizing high quality among providers that serve mostly cost‐sensitive, 
private pay families may prove difficult.  
But perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from this history, if policymakers hope to mitigate 
unintended consequences, is that they must carefully consider all the potential outcomes of their policy 
decisions and be flexible as regulations are implemented and tested.  Just as Wisconsin Shares policies 
were very dynamic in the years after the initial implementation, YoungStar policies may need frequent 
tinkering.   
A proven, robust relationship exists between higher‐quality early childhood care and education and 
positive outcomes such as greater academic achievement, higher earnings potential, and productive 
citizenship.  These long‐term benefits drive the need for child care policy with a focus on quality.     
 
 
